The Catholic Lawyer
Volume 8
Number 2 Volume 8, Spring 1962, Number 2

Article 9

Note: Compulsory Medical Treatment for Minors and Religious
Freedom

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl
Part of the First Amendment Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Religion
Commons
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St.
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
NOTE: COMPULSORY MEDICAL
TREATMENT FOR MINORS AND
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
On March 1, 1961, a child was admitted
to a New Jersey hospital for treatment of
a congenital heart disorder which had resulted in a reduction of the blood flow
through the lungs and a chronic lack of
oxygen. His parents had executed a written consent to the performance of surgery
upon the boy and to all other necessary
medical procedures with one reservation
-they would not consent to a blood transfusion. Both father and mother were members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's
Witnesses and maintained that, on religious
grounds, they could not in conscience permit their child to be the subject of a
blood transfusion.' The condition of the
child deteriorated steadily and it was the
considered opinion of the hospital physicians that unless a transfusion be performed, the child would probably perish,
1 See,

e.g.,

LEVITICUS

17: 10-14 (Douay Rheims):

"If any man whosoever of the house of Israel,
and of the strangers that sojourn among them,
eat blood, I will set my face against his soul
and will cut him off from among his people.";
ACTS 15: 28, 29 (Confraternity): "For the Holy
Spirit and we have decided to lay no further burden upon you but this indispensable one, that
you abstain from things sacrificed to idols and
from blood and from what is strangled and
from immorality ....
The Jehovah's Witnesses
interpret these passages, among others, as clearly

indicating that blood transfusion is contrary to
the word of God.

or, at the least, severe brain damage would
result. Permission to administer a transfusion was requested from the parents, but
they refused. The superintendent of the
hospital made application to the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of New Jersey's Hudson County to have the parents
adjudged guilty of neglecting the child and
to have a special guardian appointed for
the sole purpose of consenting to the administration of the necessary medical attention given to the child in the form of
blood transfusions. At the hearing which
took place on the night of March 3, two
physicians testified that unless the transfusions were performed, it was probable
that the child would die, and that even if
the child should survive without the transfusion, the lack of oxygen would result in
a severe impairment of his mental processes. The parents, testifying in their own
behalf, restated their position that their religious convictions did not permit them
to consent to the transfusion. The court
adjudged the parents guilty of neglect, appointed the superintendent of the hospital
guardian and authorized him to consent to
the administration of a blood transfusion.
The transfusion was performed. The child
2
died.
2 State

v. Perricone, Hudson Co. Juv. & Dom.

Rel. Ct., June 23, 1961. The case is as yet unreported. It is one of novel impression and has

been certified to the Supreme Court of New Jersey without being reviewed at the intermediate
appellate level, indicating the significance with

which it is regarded.
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Aside from the unfortunate death of the
child in the case discussed above, the determination of the court that the state
should intervene in such case and direct that
the necessary medical treatment be administered seems virtually unassailable - unless, of course, one happens to be a Jehovah's Witness. The overwhelming majority
of persons discern few limitations on the
extent to which they may avail themselves
of medical techniques in order to preserve
the life and health of themselves and their
families.3 In those instances where the religious beliefs of a particular sect prevent
its members from availing themselves of a
particular medical technique or procedure,
the states have made it quite clear that
their concern for the well-being of minor
children is going to outweigh any reluctance regarding interference with the religious practices of the parents.
The primary, questions which arise in the
area of the state's action in removing the
child from its parents and ensuring the performance of a medical procedure to which
they cannot, in conscience, consent are
relatively clear.
(1) Does the state have the authority
to remove the child from the custody of
the parent under such circumstances, and
if so, what is the source of that power?
(2) Is such state action contrary to and
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution since it
appears to be an interference with the freedom of religion guaranteed by the first
amendment?
At common law, the father's right to the
3 The scope of this note is limited to the legal as-

pect of the problem. The moral implications
in this area will be treated in a future issue of
The Catholic Lawyer.
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care, custody and control of his minor children was regarded as virtually inviolable,
and the courts would not intervene unless
the parent had manifested unfitness to a
degree where he could no longer claim the
rights of a father toward the child.4 The
jurisdiction to divest the unfit parent of
custody was exercised by the Court of
Chancery, the arm of the King in acting
as parens patriae.5 As early as 1722, it
was asserted that
the King is protector of all his subjects; that
in virtue of his high trust, he is more particularly to take care of those who are not
able to take care of themselves, consequently of infants, who by reason of their
nonage are under incapacities ....1
This equity jurisdiction was carried over
to the United States, and the state, as
sovereign, became the protector of those
non sui juris.7 Legislation, embodying the
underlying principle of the state as parens
patriae, was enacted in almost all states,
and was generally of two types: (a) statutes imposing criminal sanctions on a
parent or guardian who had neglected to
furnish necessaries to his minor children
when he had the means to do so; and (b)
juvenile court acts providing the basis for
a transferral of custody, either temporary
or permanent, where the child was found
to be neglected.8
4 See In re

Agar-Ellis, 24 Ch. D. 317 (1883);
In re Goldsworthy, 2 Q.B.D. 75 (1876).
5See Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wms. 103, 24 Eng.
Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722). See also Comment, 28
ROCKY MT. L. REV. 235 (1956);

30 ST. JOHN'S

L. REV. 94 (1955).
6 See Eyre v. Shaftsbury, supra note 5, at 12324, 24 Eng. Rep. at 666. But see 4 POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1304 n.14 (5th ed., Symons 1941).
7 See Arnold v. Arnold, 246 Ala. 86, -,
18 So.
2d 730, 734 (1944). See also Note, 41 GEO. L.J.
226, 227 (1953).
8 Note, supra note 7, at 227.
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In England, it was a misdemeanor for a
parent to neglect to furnish his minor child
with necessary medical care. Where the
parent, however, had acted in good faith
and resorted to prayer and trust in God
instead of a physician to heal his ailing
child, such omission was not considered so
gross as to be criminal.9 In 1868, upon the
trial of a parent whose child had died when
the parent refused medical care for him,
the court charged the jury to the effect that
if they believed the basis of the defendant's
refusal to provide medical aid was his religious conviction that God would cure the
child, they should find him not guilty. They
did.", The social implications of this decision impelled the legislature to pass remedial statutes making it a misdemeanor for
a parent wilfully to neglect to provide necessary medical aid for his child." In 1894,
the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act
was passed, Section 1 of which provided
that "if any person . ..who has the custody, charge or care of any child ...wilfully ...neglects . . . such child ...in a
manner likely to cause such child ...injury to its health ...that person shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor."' 1 2 No reference
was made expressly to a failure to furnish
medical aid, and it remained doubtful
whether the statute implied such failure. If
so, was a parent's refusal based on religious grounds a good defense? The answer
was not long in coming in the case of
Regina v. Senior, 13 which remains today
the leading English decision on this point.
10 Cox Crim. Cas.
530 (1868). See also 21 AM. & ENG. ENC. LAW
199 (2d ed. 1902).
10 Regina v. Wagstaffe, spra note 9.
11 See Cawley, Criminal Liaility in Faith Healing, 39 MINN. L. Riiv. 48, 54 (1954).
'.Prevention of Cruelly to Children Act, 1894,
57 & 58 Vict., c. 41, § 1.
1- [1899] 1 Q. B. 283, 19 Cox Crim. Cas. 219.
9See Regina v. Wagstaffe,

The defendant Senior was indicted for
manslaughter growing out of the death of
his nine-month old child. The child had
contracted pneumonia, but Senior, a member of a faith-healing sect known as the
"Peculiar People," called in the elders to
pray and anoint the child with oil. He refused to call in medical aid although seven
of his twelve children had already perished
under similar circumstances. The trial
judge charged the jury that if they found
that the defendant had done anything expressly forbidden by statute, he would be
guilty of manslaughter, regardless of his
motive or state of mind. Senior was convicted.
The leading case in the United States in
this area is People v. Pierson.14 Pierson, a
member of a faith-healing sect styled the
Christian Catholic Church of Chicago, refused to call in a physician to treat his
sixteen-month old adopted daughter who
had contracted catarrhal pneumonia. The
child died and Pierson was indicted for a
misdemeanor growing out of the violation
of Section 288 of the New York Penal
Code, which provided that a person who
wilfully omitted, without lawful excuse, to
furnish medical attendance to a minor
child was guilty of a misdemeanor. Pierson
offered in defense that he was committed
to the religious belief of divine healing,
that he had no faith in doctors and that his
religion dictated that the child would recover through prayer. The New York
Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate
Division and affirming the conviction which
had been adjudged in the trial court, stated
that "full and free enjoyment of religious
profession and worship is guaranteed, but
acts which are not worship are not.""' The
1.1
176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
."Id.
at 211, 68 N.E. at 246.

8
decision reached in the Pierson case is
the well-settled rule regarding parental liability for deaths resulting from a refusal
to furnish medical attendance to a minor
child on the ground of religious beliefs.
Such beliefs are no defense.
The law, like people, learns from the
pain of its mistakes and within a short
time began to apply the old adage that "an
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure" to the problem of medical care for
minor children. Criminal sanctions imposed upon the parents could not return
the life of a dead child and the state devised a different approach to the matter juvenile court legislation. The first juvenile
court in the world began its legal existence
in Chicago on July 1, 1899 and was widely
acclaimed as a revolutionary advance in
the treatment of delinquent and neglected
children.' 6 Within a decade, twenty states
and the District of Columbia had enacted
juvenile court laws," and by 1945, when
Wyoming adopted such a law, all the states
had enacted statutes providing either for
separate juvenile courts or for specialized
jurisdiction in children's cases in existing
courts.' 8 These acts which took root in the
various states differed considerably in many
areas, but almost all provided the court
with authority to remove a minor child
from the custody of its parents and to
award such custody, either temporarily or
permanently, to a guardian subject to the
continuing order of the court. 19 The Children's Court Act of New York, for instance, provides, inter alia, that a neglected
child is one "whose parent, guardian or
16 Caldwell, The Juvenile Court: Its Development
and Some Major Problems, 51 J. CRIM. L., C.

& P.S. 493 (1961).
17
Id. at 496.
isNote, 41 GEO. L.J. 226, 229 (1953).

19Ibid.
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custodian neglects or refuses, when able
to do so, to provide necessary medical,
surgical, institutional or hospital care for
such child ....-2oFurthermore, the statute
provides that the court may, in its discretion, cause any child within its jurisdiction
to be examined by a physician appointed
by the court, and if the child appears to be
in need of medical or surgical care, the
court may make an order for such treatment. 21 In the Matter of Vasko challenged
the constitutionality of this section of the
22
act and upheld it.
Vasko involved a twoyear old child who was suffering from a
malignant growth of the eye which the
medical experts agreed would undoubtedly
cause her death. The court pointed out
that
it was the intention of the Legislature to
invest the court with wide powers of
discretion, to be exercised on the advice of
competent medical or surgical authority, uninfluenced by the whims or arbitrarydetermination of parents or guardians, in ad2
vancing the well being of the child.
The mother of the child, in refusing to permit the operation, had stated that "God
gave her the baby and God can do what
He wants.' 2 4 It would appear that the Ap-

20N.Y. CHILDREN'S CT.ACT § 2 (4)

(e).

21N.Y. CHILDREN'S CT.ACT § 24.
22 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (2d

Dep't 1933). See also In the Matter of Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Child.
Ct. 1941); cf. In re Seiferth, 127 N.Y.S.2d 63
(Child. Ct. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 285
App. Div. 221, 137 N.Y.S.2d 35 (4th Dep't),
rev'd, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
"3In the Matter of Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128,
130, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552, 555 (2d Dep't 1933)
(emphasis added).
24 Ibid. See Cawley, Criminal Liability in Faith
Healing, 39 MINN. L. REV. 48, 62-63 for the
particularly moving account of the tragic death
of an infant child involving a refusal by the par-
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pellate Division of the Supreme Court of
the State of New York did not agree.
Strangely enough, the Supreme Court
of the United States has never passed directly upon a case involving this problem,
although there have been a number of
such cases. 25 The nearest the Court has
come to the issue was a denial of certiorari
in the case of People ex rel. Wallace v.
Labrenz,2 6 a case involving a blood transfusion where the parents, Jehovah's Witnesses, had refused to consent. The mother
of the child had testified
we feel that we would be breaking God's
commandment, also destroying the baby's
life for the future, not only this life, in case
the baby should die and breaks the commandment, not only destroys our chances
but also the baby's chances for future life.
27
We feel it is more important than this life.
As always, the court took care to explain
that "freedom of religion and the right of
the parents to the care and training of their
children are to be accorded the highest possible respect in our basic scheme, '' ' and
then proceeded to override their objections.
Quoting extensively from the case of Reynolds v. United States, 29 which affirmed the
conviction of a Mormon for practicing
polygamy, the court pointed out that
laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with
ents to consent to a blood transfusion on religious grounds. In that case too, a mother had
stated that "if the baby dies, that is God's will.
I have no fear."
25See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz,
618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344
411 I11.
U.S. 824 (1952); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d

97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); Mitchell v. Davis, 205
S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
6411 111.
618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344
U.S. 824 (1952).
I'
d. at-, 104 N.E.2d at 772.
28

29

Id. at -, 104 N.E.2d at 773.
98 U.S. 145 (1879).

mere religious belief and opinions, they may
with practices. Suppose one believed that
human sacrifices were a necessary part of
religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under
which he lived could not interfere to prevent
a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed
it was her duty to burn herself upon the
funeral pile of her dead husband, would it
be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into
30
practice?
The obvious reply to both hypothetical
questions is "no," for in a pluralistic society this would amount to permitting every
' '3
citizen "to become a law unto himself, 1
and no government survives in a state of
anarchy. It is highly questionable, however, that hypothetical questions of the type
put forth in the Reynolds opinion are of
any aid in the resolution of a problem
such as arises in the blood transfusion area
Both the hypotheticals involve affirmative
acts, the doing of certain things which a
government, in the interests of its own
survival, can clearly prohibit. The cases
with which we are now concerned involve
negative conduct, the not doing of something. The law quite frequently tells a
man what he may not do. It seldom tells
him what he must do. In addition, neither
of the hypothetical situations raised in the
Reynolds case involved the parent-child
relationship which so peculiarly colors this
area. Lastly, both hypotheticals are extreme cases, clearly black in a problem
situation which is really one of degree and
where the facts can take on a decidedly
grayish tint. It is of no assistance to offer
the extremities of hypothesis and to proWallace v. Labrenz, supra note
104 N.E.2d at 774, quoting Reynolds

30 People ex rel.

25, at -,

v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879).
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167
(1879).

31 Reynolds

8

duce a result which is based upon them
seem plausible. No Jehovah's Witness
would argue that he can do whatever he
wishes in the name of religion, but he will
contend that he has the primary right to
the custody of his minor child. He will insist that his refusal to permit a blood transfusion which he believes would defile that
child does not render it "neglected" and
that such a refusal is not a valid reason
to make the child a ward of the state.
The court in the Wallace case proceeded
to cite a passage from Prince v. Massachusetts, 32 which probably reflects the dominant judicial attitude in this area, although
the latter decision was not concerned with
medical care. The Court in the Prince
case, almost as if it were deciding on the
issue under discussion, stated that
the right to practice religion freely does not
include liberty to expose the ... child to...
ill health or death .... Parents may be free
to become martyrs themselves. But it does
not follow they are free in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full and
legal discretion when they can make that
33
choice for themselves.
The cases which have been discussed to
this point have illustrated state intervention where the minor child was exposed to
a serious threat to life by the refusal of
its parents to permit the recommended
medical treatment. The intervention of the
state, however, has not been limited to circumstances presenting a risk of death. For
instance, In the Matter of Rotkowitz 34 involved the plight of a ten-year old girl suffering from a deformed leg which had been
caused by poliomyelitis. The mother of the
'2321

U.S. 158 (1944).

'"Id. at 166, 170.

;" 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Child. Ct.
1941).
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child was anxious to have the needed surgery performed, but the father, for some unexpressed reason, would not approve. The
hospital refused to operate without the consent of both parents, unless ordered to do
so by the court. The life of the child was
not in danger, but the court, in ordering
the required surgery, stated that
it was the intention of the Legislature to
give power to the Justices of this Court to
order an operation not only in an instance
where the life of the child is to be saved but
also in instances where the health, the limb,
the person
or the future of the child is at
35
stake.
There was language in the Rotkowitz
opinion which was to bear fruit in another
New York case some eleven years later.
In Rotkowitz, the court had stated that
there were certain psychological consequences present where a child with a deformed limb was involved. Such child
"cannot have a sense of security," but
"feels itself different from others" and
"suffers from a sense of rejection."3 6 In
37
1952, In re Carstairs
was presented to
the Children's Court of New York's Bronx
County. It involved a minor child whose
conduct had indicated that he was "suffering from some emotional instability or some
emotional disturbance which causes him to
do all these things." 8 The mother of the
child had been informed frequently of such
conduct but had not attempted to have him
treated by a psychiatrist. The reason for
such failure does not appear in the opinion.
The court found that the mother had neglected the boy although there was nothing
physically wrong with him, and ordered
the child to a mental hospital for psychiatric
d. at 950, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
: hi. at 950, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
17 115 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Child. Ct. 1952).
-Id. at 316.
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examination, stating that "if there is nothing the matter with him no harm will be
done.'" ' This appears to be a rather cavalier approach to the matter since if nothing
was wrong with the boy, the mother had
been deprived of the custody of her child
even though her judgment of the situation
had been the correct one, and the "neglect"
upon which the court had taken custody did
not in fact exist. Hadn't some harm been
done?
The New York courts had progressed
from the Rotkowitz case, involving a purely
physical defect with no danger to life, to
In re Carstairs involving a suspected psychological problem. In 1954, the Children's
Court of New York's Erie County was to be
faced with a case blending both the physical and the psychological." The child, a
twelve-year old boy, was afflicted with a
congenital hare-lip and severe cleft palate
which gave him an ugly appearance and
caused a marked speech defect. It was
stated that the child was emotionally and
psychologically sensitive to his condition.
There was no danger of death or physical
health involved. The father objected to
the recommended surgery because of "religious beliefs" and on the ground that the
child's fear of doctors, which grew out of
the "religious beliefs" passed on to him by
the father, would vitiate the benefits of the
operation.
The court pointed out that the father's
objections to the surgery were philosophical, not religious, since there were no
39Id. at
40 In re

317.
Seiferth, 127 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Child Ct.

1954), rev'd on other grounds, 285 App. Div. 221,
137 N.Y.S.2d 35 (4th Dep't), rev'd, 309 N.Y. 80,

moral implications in his position. It went
on to state that had the case arisen earlier,
it would have ordered the surgery without
hesitation. The child, however, had been
so well indoctrinated in the philosophical
beliefs of his father regarding the curative
power of "natural forces" that "to arbitrarily force this child to submit to surgery,
which he has been 'conditioned' to fear,
might do more harm than good."' 4 1 The

court ordered that the child be instructed
regarding the benefits which would accrue
to him from the medical treatment and
that the child then be given the opportunity
of making his own decision.
The Appellate Division, two justices dissenting, reversed, holding that the lower
court had abused its discretion. The boy
had received the instructions ordered by
the lower court rega'rding the benefits of
surgery, but had decided to try for some
time longer to cure the defect through
"natural forces." The appellate court stated
that "it is a serious error to permit this
twelve-year old boy, a victim of his father's
delusions, to make such a choice for himself" because "he does not appreciate the
nature of the operation or the conse2
The court
quences of the alternative.""1

ordered the relief requested, reasoning that
the possible psychological danger of a
forced operation was outweighed by the
certain psychological effect of permitting
the child to enter adolescence with such a
deformity and handicap.
The Court of Appeals, three judges dissenting, reversed, stressing the psychological handicap the boy faced in overcoming
the teachings of his father and that time

127 N.E.2d 820 (1955); see Comment, 12 WASH.

4' In

& LEE L. REV. 239, 241-45 (1955); 4 BUFFALO
L. REV. 346 (1955); 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 629
(1956); 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 373 (1955).

42

re Seiferth, supra note 40, at 65.
In the Matter of Seiferth, 285 App. Div. 221,
225, 137 N.Y.S.2d 35, 38-39 (4th Dep't 1955)
(emphasis added).
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was not of the essence. The court pointed
out that the trial court had been keenly
aware of the various psychological factors,
had seen and heard the parties and had
not abused its discretion in refusing to
order the surgery. The dissenting opinion
sharply disagreed, stating that "it is the
court . . .that has a duty to perform...
and it should not seek to avoid that duty
by foisting upon the boy the ultimate de43
cision to be made."
While there were no religious objections
raised regarding the medical treatment
recommended in the Rotkowitz, Carstairs
and Seiferth cases, it would appear that
such objections would not have met with
any success had they been presented. The
judicial attitude in regard to cases of this
type is almost unanimously one of approval.44 Religious beliefs which would
lead to conduct or an omission to act,
which would be contrary to public policy,
may not be permitted. The Seiferth case
would seem to indicate that, in New York
at least, the desire of the parents and the
3 In the Matter of Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 87, 127
N.E.2d 820, 824 (1955) (dissenting opinion).

44See cases cited note 25 supra. But see In re

Tuttendario, 21 Pa. Dist. 561 (1911) holding that
the refusal of the parents to consent to an operation because they feared the child would not
survive did not amount to such neglect as to authorize the court to award custody of the child
to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children. The court stated that "we have not yet
adopted as a public policy the Spartan rule that
children belong, not to their parents but to the
state.
...
Id. at 563. Pennsylvania has since
seen a statutory change which would remove the
authority of the Tuttendario decision. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, §243(5) (Purdon 1939). See also
In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765
(1942) holding that the refusal of a mother on
other than religious grounds to allow the ampution of a deformed arm which posed a threat to
the life of her child was not sufficient to justify
a conclusion that the child was neglected and to
permit the court to order the operation.
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child that the operation not take place will
not be overridden without some hesitation,
but the sharpness of the split in the court
would lead one to wonder if the same
result would be reached today.
In summary, it might be worthwhile to
see briefly where we have been, where we
now are and where we may be going. We
have traced the power of the King as
parens patriae, guardian of those non sui
juris, into the state as sovereign. We have
observed the transition from the English
common law, where a refusal to furnish
medical attention to a minor child because
of religious convictions was a valid defense in a criminal action, to the present
state of the law, where parents and those
who counsel them may be convicted of involuntary manslaughter should the child
die because of the failure to provide the
needed treatment. We have pointed out
the unanimous enactment of juvenile court
legislation, permitting the state to take custody of the child and to order the necessary medical attention; at first only where
there was a risk of death, then in cases
where there was a physical defect although
no risk of death, and onward to the point
where neither a threat to life nor a physical defect was involved, but simply a suspicion of emotional disturbance.
The essential questions, of course, are
clear. Has the state, in its anxiety to protect minor children from what it considers
to be ignorance and superstition which
would deny them necessary medical treatment, gone past the point of merely intervening to protect our children? Has it begun to intrude aggressively, to substitute
the judgment of the doctors and scientists
for that of the parents? Do such cases as
those involving blood transfusions result as
they do because an unpopular minority
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sect is involved? Would any public official,
be he legislator or judge, dare to outrage
a large segment of the electorate by overruling its religious beliefs? One advocate of
the position that the courts have gone too
far has stated that
. . . civil and religious liberties are being
broken down. The consequence is an eroding away of the principles upon which the

Recent Decision:
Lawyers' Right to Incorporate
For many years, because of the fear
that the attorney-client relationship would
be undermined, attorneys have been denied the right to incorporate. Recently,
however, the Florida Supreme Court, acting on a request of the Florida Bar Association, amended its Integration Rules and
Code of Ethics to allow members of the
Florida Bar to incorporate. Considering the
restricted nature of the corporation and the
possible tax advantages to be had by the
members of the bar, the Court held that
attorneys may practice law in the corporate form.1
At common law corporations could
not be formed for the purpose of practicing
law. 2 In 1910, the New York Court of
Appeals 3 flatly denied the right of attorneys to practice law in the corporate form,
stating that to permit a corporation to
stand between the attorney and client
1 In the Matter of The Florida Bar, -

Fla.

-,

133 So. 2d 554 (1961).
2 See Jones,
FORDHAM

The Professional Corporation, 27

L. REV. 353 (1958); Lewis, Corpo-

rate Capacity to Practice Law - A Study in
Legal Hocus Pocus, 2 MD. L. REv. 342 (1938);
Maier & Wild, Taxation of Professional Firms as
Corporations, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 127 (1960).

In the Matter of the Co-operative Law Co.,
198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910).

3

democratic state stands, and ultimate damage to the nation and all its people.. . . to
sacrifice principle for expediency creates

precedent that breaks down the whole fibre
of principle and personal responsibility
upon which the welfare of the nation depends. Frankly, the price is too high .... 45
45 How, Blood Transfusion - A Legal, Religious
and Medical Issue, 3 CAN. B.J. 365, 419 (1960).

would tend to subvert the high standard of
care owed by the attorney to his client.
The court further stated that the attorney
would be subject to the directions of the

employer-corporation, rather than those of
the client, and that the corporate stock
might be owned totally or in part by laymen, who would then in effect, be practicing law or controlling its practice. The
lack of judicial control over the corporation, since it could not be disbarred or
suspended, and the fact that unscrupulous
practitioners might find shelter from malpractice liability in the corporation were
other factors which persuaded the court
to forbid such incorporation.
The same reasoning was invariably
applied as the principle of law established
by the New York court was accepted
throughout the country.4 The court decisions were fortified by statutes, which were
of two general types-the first forbidding
incorporation for the purpose of practicing
4Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S.E.
796 (1932); New Jersey Photo Engraving Co.
v. Carl Schonert & Sons, Inc., 95 N.J. Eq. 12,
122 Atl. 307 (Ch. 1923); Land Title Abstract
& Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193
N.E. 650 (1934); State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac.
694 (1919); cf. In the Matter of Eastern Idaho
Loan & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157
(1930).

